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Abstract
In previous work, an abstract certiﬁcation technique for Java source code was proposed based on rewriting logic,
which is a semantic framework that has been eﬃciently implemented in the rule–based programming language
Maude. Starting from a speciﬁcation of a (generic) Java abstract semantics written in Maude, we develop
an abstract veriﬁcation technique that essentially consists of a reachability analysis using the Java abstract
semantics. We provide facilities to associate abstract domains to the variables of the considered Java program
so that the resulting state–space is ﬁnite. As a by–product of the abstract veriﬁcation, a safety certiﬁcate is
delivered that contains a set of (abstract) rewriting proofs that can be checked by the code consumer using a
standard rewriting logic engine. The main advantage is that the amount of code that must be explicitly trusted
is very small. This paper presents a Web tool that implements the abstract certiﬁcation technique by providing
appropriate abstract domains for diﬀerent safety properties while hiding the technical details of the method
from the user. The tool has been devised to be easily extendable to other properties and domains. It currently
supports the certiﬁcation of two kinds of safety properties that are not handled by standard Java compilers:
secure integer arithmetic rules and non–interference policies.
Keywords: automated certiﬁcation, rewriting logic, Maude, web tool
1 Introduction
Proof–Carrying Code (PCC) is a technique that can be used for safe execution of
untrusted code [13,14]. In a typical instance of PCC (see Figure 1), a code receiver (the
code consumer) speciﬁes a set of safety requirements (a safety policy) that guarantee
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Fig. 1. Java PCC Infrastructure
the safe behavior of programs, and the code producer creates a formal safety proof (the
certiﬁcate) that proves, for the untrusted code, compliance with the safety policy. Then,
the receiver is able to use a simple and fast proof validator (the certiﬁcate checker) to
check with certainty that the proof is valid and, hence, the untrusted code is safe to
execute.
In [1], we presented an abstract PCC methodology for certifying Java source code
that is based on rewriting logic [12]. Starting from a speciﬁcation of the Java semantics
written in Maude, we provide facilities to associate abstract domains to the variables
in the untrusted Java program so that the resulting state–space becomes ﬁnite. This
allows us to implement an abstract veriﬁcation methodology that essentially consists
of a reachability analysis using our abstract Java semantics. As a by–product of the
abstract veriﬁcation, a dependable safety certiﬁcate is delivered, which consists of a
set of (abstract) rewriting proofs. This simple technique allows us to certify diﬀerent
safety properties that are not handled by any standard Java compiler, such as secure
integer arithmetic [1] and non–interference policies [2].
This paper describes a Web tool that implements the abstract certiﬁcation technique
of [2,1]. The tool provides appropriate abstract domains for diﬀerent properties while
hiding the technical details of the method from the user. It allows safety properties
to be certiﬁed, i.e., properties of a system that are deﬁned in terms of certain events
not happening, which we characterize as unreachability problems in rewriting logic.
Given a concurrent system described by a term rewriting system and a safety property
that speciﬁes the system states that should never occur, the unreachability of all these
states from the considered initial state allows us to infer the desired safety property.
Following the PCC infrastructure depicted in Figure 1, our tool can be used at the
code producer side to certiﬁcate Java source code. We summarize its design principles
as well as the representation issues of the safety policy and proofs, and show that the
trusted computing base (TCB) in such a system can indeed be very small.
This paper is a new, totally redesigned implementation of the technique of [2] in
order to: (i) deal with non–interference policies, (ii) improve both functionality and
performance upon the former version, and (iii) make the system easier to use and
extend.
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2 Abstract Certiﬁcation Methodology
In order to lower the computational costs of veriﬁcation and avoid speciﬁcation burdens
on the experts, we enforce ﬁnite–state models of programs by using abstract interpre-
tation [4]. Our methodology, which was presented in [1], can be summarized as follows.
Starting from the speciﬁcation of the Java semantics in rewriting logic formalized in [7],
we developed an abstract, ﬁnite–state operational semantics (in rewriting logic), which
is parametric w.r.t. the abstract domain and which is appropriate for program veriﬁ-
cation. Using this abstract, ﬁnite–state operational semantics, we deﬁne a source code
certiﬁcation technique. The key idea for the certiﬁcation tool is to test the unreach-
ability of Java states that represent the counterpart of the safety property fulﬁlment
using the standard Maude (breadth–ﬁrst) search command that explores the abstract
ﬁnite state–space of the program. In the case when the test succeeds, the corresponding
rewriting proofs, which demonstrate the unreachability of those states, are delivered
as the expected outcome certiﬁcate. Certiﬁcates are encoded as (abstract) rewriting
sequences that, together with the extended abstract semantics and the encoding in
Maude of the abstraction, can be checked by a standard reduction engine by means of
a rewriting process which is very simpliﬁed.
We use the rewriting logic semantics of Java given in [7] and used by the JavaFAN
veriﬁcation tool [6,8]. This semantics copes with a suﬃciently large subset of the full
Java 1.4 language speciﬁed in Maude, including multithreading, inheritance, polymor-
phism, object references, and dynamic object allocation. However, Java native methods
and many of the Java built–in libraries available are not supported. The novelty and in-
terest of this semantics are based on the following advantages: (i) formal speciﬁcations
provide a rigorous semantic deﬁnition for a language that can be mathematically scru-
tinized; (ii) such formal speciﬁcations can be developed with relatively little eﬀort 7 ,
even for large languages like Java [6] and the JVM [8]; (iii) the Maude programming
language [3], which implements rewriting logic, provides a formal analysis infrastruc-
ture, so that its formal analysis tools (such as state–space breadth–ﬁrst search and
LTL model checking) become available for free for each programming language that is
speciﬁed in Maude; and (iv) in spite of their generality, those formal analyses can be
performed with competitive performance; see [6].
The safety policy is expressed by means of a set of abstract requirements on the
variables of the Java source program. These are written by using the Java Modeling
Language JML syntax. JML is a behavioral interface speciﬁcation language that accepts
Java built–in operators [11]. The code consumer states the safety policy by using the
JML assert, requires and ensures clauses intermixed with the Java code method to
be certiﬁed. The text of a JML annotation can be either in one line, after the marker
//@, or in many lines enclosed between the markers /*@ and @*/.
/*@ requires <method precondition>;
@ ensures <method postcondition>;
@ assert <predicate>; @*/
7 See the diﬀerent programming languages available at [7].
M. Alba-Castro et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 248 (2009) 19–29 21
The tool automatically generates the Maude encoding of the abstraction, as well
as the search command containing the initial state that includes the wrapped, supple-
mented Java program, together with the ﬁnal state, which depends on the expected
method outcome.
The tool can generate three diﬀerent certiﬁcates: full certiﬁcate, reduced rules cer-
tiﬁcate, and reduced labels certiﬁcate. The full certiﬁcate includes all Maude equations
and rules (together with the corresponding matching substitutions) used in the rewrit-
ing proof. According to the diﬀerent treatment of rules and equations in Maude, an
extremely reduced rules certiﬁcate can be delivered by just recording the rewrite steps
given with the rules, while the rewritings with the equations are omitted. This is jus-
tiﬁed by the fact that, in Maude, reducing with equations is deterministic and also
because Maude is very eﬃcient at doing it. Finally, the reduced labels certiﬁcate only
records the labels of the applied rules.
The tool can certify code that complies with user–deﬁned integer–arithmetic safety
properties that are not checked by standard Java compilers [1]. The tool can also
certify code that obeys user–deﬁned policies for input–output data non–interference
[15]. Informally, non–interference means that the public output data do not depend on
secret input data. We consider non–interference policies that associate conﬁdentiality
level labels to variables [5,9,10] (High labels to secret variables and Low labels to public
non–secret variables) so that ﬂows from variables labeled High to variables labeled Low
are forbidden.
Example 2.1 Consider the following Java method, borrowed from [10], that contains
a conditional statement. Its input variables high and low are respectively labeled with
High and Low conﬁdentiality labels, meaning that the variable high is secret and the
variable low is public. This Java function does comply with the non–interference policy
in spite of the fact that an illicit and indirect information ﬂow, within the guard of the
if statement, exists from the variable high to low. This is a temporary breach, because
of the legal and direct ﬂow from the constant 0, indeed a public value, to the variable
low after the if statement.
static int mE3(int high,int low) {
/*@ requires AbsValue(low) == #Low && AbsValue(high) == #High;
@ ensures AbsValue(\result) == #Low; @*/
if (high == 1)
low = 1;
low = 0;
return low;
}
The abstract domain for the non–interference certiﬁcation of this example is
the set of conﬁdentiality labels LV alue = {#High, #Low} [2]. The JML clause
“requires AbsValue(high) == #High && AbsValue(low) == #Low;”, states that
the variable high is labeled High, so that it is secret, and that the variable low is la-
beled Low, so that it is public. The clause “ensures AbsValue(\result) == #Low;”
states that the outcome of the method should be public.
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Let us now describe the abstract domains that we have included in our tool for
certifying Java programs that make heavy use of integer–arithmetic. These include,
among others, the abstract domains EvenOdd (the abstract domain of even and odd
integer numbers) and Mod4 (the abstract domain of Java integers modulo 4). Namely,
EvenOdd = {bot, #even, #odd, top}, where bot = ∅, #even = {int(n) | n mod 2 = 0},
#odd = {int(n) | n mod 2 = 1}, and 8 top = int(Int). On the other hand,
Mod4 = {bot, #0, #1, #2, #3, top}, where #k = {int(n) | n mod 4 = k} for
k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. The JML clause “requires AbsValue(n) == #even;” states that
the variable n is associated to the abstract domain EvenOdd and its value should be
even. The clause “ensures AbsValue(\result) == #even;” states that the outcome
value of the method (denoted by the keyword \result) should be even. The clause
“assert AbsDomain(k) == EvenOdd;” states that the local variable k is associated
to the abstract domain EvenOdd.
We also provide several combined abstract domains that are parametric w.r.t. two
Java variables x,y and capture Boolean relations on Java integers. As a proof of concept
we consider two Boolean relations: the less–than–or–equal–to, and the greater–than re-
lations, i.e., x ≤ y and x > y. For instance, the JML clause “assert AbsDomain(i) ==
(EvenOdd, (<=,n));” states that variable i is abstracted using the domain EvenOdd
and that its value is less than or equal to the value of n.
Example 2.2 Consider the following Java program with a while statement, requiring
a condition on the input to ensure the fulﬁllment of the considered safety property.
The parity of the output is required to be even under the assumption that the input
parameter n belongs to the abstract domain Mod4. EvenOdd is the abstract domain
associated to variable sum. In order to deal with the condition of the while, we have
to use a combined domain for variable i: the JML clause “assert AbsDomain(i) ==
(Mod4, (<=,n));”, states that the variable i is abstracted using the domain Mod4
and that its value is less than or equal to the value of n.
static int summation(int n) {
/*@ requires AbsValue(n) == #0 || AbsValue(n) == #3;
@ ensures AbsValue(\result) == #even ; @*/
int sum = 0 ;
//@ assert AbsDomain(sum) == EvenOdd ;
int i = 0;
//@ assert AbsDomain(i) == (Mod4, (<=, n)) ;
while (i<=n) {
sum += i;
i++;
}
return sum;
}
In [1], the reader can ﬁnd many examples of Java programs and integer arithmetic–
8 Recall that Int is the Maude sort of integer number whereas int is the Java integer constructor used by the
Maude, Java Rewriting Logic semantics.
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Fig. 2. Web interface of the JavaCC tool
based safety properties, together with some ﬁgures concerning the size of the certiﬁcates
as well as the certiﬁcate generation and validation times.
3 Interface and Functionality
The abstract certiﬁcation technique presented so far has been implemented in Maude
[3]. Java has been used to develop the Web interface.
This new tool allows the user to enter the Java code methods annotated with the
JML clauses, whereas the preliminary implementation of the tool [1] forced the user to
associate code variables with the abstract domains by using push buttons and ﬁlling in
text boxes. By using the former tool of [1], the user also had to write the method invo-
cation with its parameter values and the method abstract outcome into text boxes. The
new tool avoids such hand–writing and generates the method invocation automatically
once the user selected the method to be certiﬁed.
The Web tool is publicly available together with a set of examples at http://www.
dsic.upv.es/users/elp/toolsMaude/rewritingLogic.html. Some snapshots of the
Web tool are shown in Figures 2, 3 and 4. Figure 2 shows the main page with the
code of Example 2.1. Figures 3 and 4 show the corresponding reduced rules certiﬁcate
split into two parts: Figure 3 shows the initial and ﬁnal states, and Figure 4 shows the
rewriting sequence with all the states and rules used. The main features of the Web
tool are:
• The Maude programming language, which implements rewriting logic, provides a for-
mal analysis infrastructure (such as state–space breadth–ﬁrst search) with competi-
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Fig. 3. Reduced rules certiﬁcate: Maude search command and ﬁnal state
tive performance (see [6]). Note that Maude could also be used as the infrastructure
required for the proof validation process at the consumer side. Actually, it suﬃces to
check that each abstract rewriting step in the certiﬁcate is valid and no other valid
rewritings have been disregarded, which essentially amounts to using the matching
infrastructure within the rewriting engine. This is simple, trustworthy, and based on
well-understood engineering and mathematical principles.
• The Java operational semantics in rewriting logic that we have used is modular and
has 2635 lines of code in 4 ﬁles [7]. We have modiﬁed 15 of the 1527 lines of code in
the main ﬁle of the original Java semantics. The abstract operational Java semantics
was developed as a source–to–source transformation in rewriting logic, and consists
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Fig. 4. Reduced rules certiﬁcate: rewriting sequence
of 608 lines of extra code. This amounts to saying that, in our current system, the
trusted computing base (TCB) is less than half the size of the original Java semantics
(at least one order of magnitude smaller than the standard rewriting infrastructure
and even much smaller than other PCC systems).
• In order to automate the processing of JML clauses, the tool uses the JavaCC com-
piler construction tool, together with a subset of the JML grammar, to generate both
the encoded Maude abstraction and the Maude search command, which contains the
supplemented Java program with the main call that invokes the method to be certi-
ﬁed. In order to build the initial state, it also uses the Java wrapper program that
is available at [7] to transform the supplemented Java program into a Maude term.
• The Web interface allows us to both make the abstract certiﬁcate technique publicly
available on–line and hide the technical details to any possible user.
The delivered certiﬁcate is generated in two steps: (i) loading the Java source code
with the JML annotations, and (ii) performing the abstract reachability analysis. Let
us illustrate the Web tool functionality by means of Example 2.1.
i. Program loading and ﬁxing abstract domains. The Java code can be loaded
from a ﬁle containing the Java program and the JML annotations. Additionally,
the Web tool lets the user select one of several predeﬁned examples. The ﬁle
“Safe1NonInterferenceC.java”, which corresponds to Example 2.1, is a predeﬁned
example shown in Figure 2. Loading a Java program indirectly provides validation of
its syntax using a standard Java compiler. The JML annotations are also validated
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within the generated JavaCC module.
ii. Abstract reachability analysis. The safety certiﬁcate (either full or reduced) is
automatically generated by the tool by clicking on the “Certify!” button. The gen-
eration process is internally performed in the following way, shown in Figures 5, 6
and 7: (i) a new Java class is created from the Java code, with the selected method
invocations and the needed parameter values, following the JML requires clause;
the Java wrapper transforms the new Java class into a Maude term which contains
the initial state (see [7] for details on how to build an initial Java state); and the
Maude abstractions of the program variables are generated from the JML requires
and assert clauses (Figure 5); (ii) we build the search command with the ﬁle gen-
erated by the Java wrapper, then we add the Maude abstractions of the variables to
the extended abstract Java semantics, and we run the search ﬁle in Maude (Figure
6); and (iii) check if the ﬁnal state reached is the expected result speciﬁed with the
ensures clause, and if so, get the rewriting sequence as the certiﬁcate that will be
delivered to the user (Figure 7).
An example of a reduced rules certiﬁcate is also shown in Figures 3 and 4.
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4 Conclusions
Proof–carrying code has a number of technical advantages over other approaches for
the problem of mobile code security. One of the most important advantages is that the
trusted code of such a system can be made small. In this work, we have presented a
Web tool for automated certiﬁcation of Java source code developed in Maude and have
shown that the trusted code can be orders of magnitude smaller than in other competing
systems (e.g., Java Virtual Machines). We have also analyzed the representation issues
of the safety speciﬁcation and shown how they relate to the size of the abstract semantics
and proof checker. In our system, the trusted code itself is based on a well–understood
and well–analyzed logical framework, which adds on to our conﬁdence in its correctness.
As far as we know, our tool is the ﬁrst sound and complete, fully automated certiﬁcation
tool that applies to the veriﬁcation of source Java code using rewriting logic.
Our tool is based on a rewriting logic semantics speciﬁcation of the full Java 1.4
language that is available at [7], and thus works with the full Java 1.4 language.
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